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NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-BENEFITS-ELIGIBILITY
KRYZSKO V. RAMSEY COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES
In Kryzsko v. Ramsey County Social Services,1 Margaret Kryzsko
appealed a district court order affirming the decision of the North
Dakota Department of Human Services (Department) to deny her
Medicaid benefits because her available assets exceeded the maximum
allowed. 2 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's
order, 3 finding that Kryzsko was the beneficiary of a support trust,4
which is considered an asset in determining Medicaid eligibility. 5
Kryzsko was a fifty-two-year old mentally disabled woman. 6 She
was the beneficiary of a trust established by her deceased father's will. 7
Kryzsko applied for Medicaid benefits through Ramsey County Social
Services in August 1994.8 Although she had been deemed eligible for
benefits from April 1995 through December 1995, she was ineligible
after December 31, 1995, because her assets, including the trust, exceed-
ed the $3,000 maximum for her household. 9 Kryzsko appealed the
eligibility decision to the Department, but an Administrative Law Judge
found the trust was a support trust, which had to be considered in deter-
mining her eligibility for benefits.10 The Department adopted those
findings, and Kryzsko appealed to the district court, which affirmed the
decision.11
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted a distinction between
support trusts and discretionary trusts. 12 While support trusts are avail-
able to the Medicaid applicant and considered in an applicant's assets,
discretionary trusts are not considered assets and are available only to the
extent that distributions are actually made to the beneficiary. 13 The
court acknowledged that the Kryzsko trust contained elements of both a
discretionary and a support trust. 14 The court ultimately concluded that
1. 2000 ND 43, 607 N.W.2d 237.
2. See Kryzsko v. Ramsey County Soc. Servs., 2000 ND 43, 1 1, 607 N.W.2d 237, 238.
3. See id. 1 29, 607 N.W.2d at 244.
4. See id. 128.
5. See id. 1 8, 607 N.W.2d at 239.
6. See id. 2, 607 N.W.2d at 238.
7. See id. The trust was originally funded with $32,000 on January 1, 1996. See id
8. See id. 13.
9. See id.
10. See id. 14.
11. See id.
12. See id. 8, 607 N.W.2d at 239.
13. See id. (citing N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-02.1-31(3), (4) (1997)).
14. See id. 16, 607 N.W.2d at 241. The Kryzsko trust provided in relevant part:
I devise Margaret Lee Kryzsko... share of my estate to my Trustee to administer said
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the plain language of the trust demonstrated an intent by the settlor to
provide for the future support and care of the beneficiarylS because: (1)
the trustee was not given unfettered discretion;16 (2) annual income
distributions were mandatory;17 and (3) the trust language did not
indicate an intent to supplement rather than provide the primary source
of income to the beneficiary.1 8 Accordingly, the court affirmed the
Department's finding. 19
Justice Maring dissented, stating that the trust language clearly
showed the settlor intended to create a discretionary trust.20 Justice
Maring noted that the settlor twice expressed his intent that the trustee
exercise "sole discretion" over the assets of the trust, and that this
language conclusively indicated his intent that the trust be discretion-
ary. 21 Accordingly, Justice Maring concluded that because the trust was
discretionary, it should not have rendered Kryzsko ineligible for
Medicaid benefits.22
CRIMINAL LAW-APPEAL
STATE V. BELL
The State of North Dakota moved to dismiss Kyle Kenneth Bell's
appeal of his murder conviction on the basis that Bell forfeited and
abandoned his appeal by escaping custody. 23 Bell was found guilty of
murdering eleven-year-old Jeanna North and was sentenced to life
imprisonment on September 24, 1999.24 On that date, Bell appealed his
conviction. 25 On October 13, 1999, while being transported from the
North Dakota State Penitentiary to a prison facility in Oregon, Bell
escaped. 26
The State asked the North Dakota Supreme Court to adopt and
apply the "fugitive dismissal rule" in its motion to dismiss Bell's
share for the benefit of her by paying to or applying for her benefit so much of the
income and/or principal of such share as the Trustee, in her sole discretion, thinks
necessary or advisable to provide for the proper care, maintenance, support, and
education of Margaret Lee Kryzsko... provided, that the Trustee must make at least an
annual distribution of the Trust income, or more frequent distribution as the Trustee, in its
sole discretion deems necessary ....
Id. 14, 607 N.W.2d at 240.
15. See id. 17, 607 N.W.2d at 241.
16. See id. 19, 607 N.W.2d at 242.
17. See id. 21
18. See id. 28, 607 N.W.2d at 244.
19. See id. 29.
20. See id. 31 (Maring, J., dissenting).
21. See id. 34, 607 N.W.2d at 245.
22. See id. 1 48, 607 N.W.2d at 248.
23. See State v. Bell, 2000 ND 58, 1, 608 N.W.2d 232, 232.
24. See id. 2.
25. See id.
26. See id.
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appeal.27 Bell was subsequently recaptured and at that time the Court
directed the filing of supplemental briefs on the motion to dismiss. 28
The fugitive dismissal rule is also known as the "fugitive disentitle-
ment doctrine" and was one of first impression to the court.29 The doc-
trine has been adopted either judicially or by statute in several states. 30 It
allows a court to dismiss an appeal of a defendant who escapes during
the pendency of his appeal. 31 The rule is based on the idea that a
"fugitive flouts the court and its authority by escaping after filing an
appeal" and that "dismissal is appropriate because the fugitive has
shown such disrespect for the legal system." 32 The rule is also used as a
tool to deter escape pending an appeal. 33 The subsequent recapture of
the defendant does not preclude application of the rule. 34
In an effort to retain his appellate rights, Bell argued that the deci-
sion to adopt the fugitive dismissal rule should be left to the legislature,
not the court. 35 However, the court noted that the rule has been adopted
judicially in other jurisdictions. 36 Bell further argued that the dismissal
of his appeal would be improper because he was entitled to an appeal as
a matter of right under North Dakota Century Code section 29-28-03.37
However, the court noted that an appeal from district court is granted by
way of state statute and an appeal may be dismissed for noncompliance
with the state's rules or statutes. 38 The court also stated that Bell had no
federal constitutional right to an appellate review of his state criminal
conviction. 39
Bell further argued that he could not be punished by having his
appeal dismissed because this would constitute double punishment, as he
could also be prosecuted for escaping. 40 The court dealt with this
argument briefly, by stating that the escape was a separate offense. 41
The court explicitly adopted and applied the fugitive dismissal
rule. 42 Further, the court found that "[d]ismissal of Bell's appeal [was]
27. See id. 13.
28. See id.
29. See id. 1 4, 608 N.W.2d at 232-33.
30. See id. 12, 608 N.W.2d at 234.
31. See id. 5, 608 N.W.2d at 233 (citing Ortega-Rodriquez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 239-
40 (1993)).
32. Id. 8. 608 N.W.2d at 233.
33. See id.
34. See id. 1 11,608 N.W.2d at 234.
35. See id. 12.
36. See id. 12-15, 608 N.W.2d at 234-35.
37. See id. 17, 608 N.W.2d at 235.
38. See id.
39. See id. (citing Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 536 (1975)).
40. See id. 19.
41. See id. (citing Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. 138, 141 (1897)).
42. See id. 1 20,606 N.W.2d at 236.
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in the best interests of both [the] court and the taxpayers of this state." 43
The state's motion was granted, and Bell's appeal dismissed.4 4 The
court expressly reserved its ruling on the issue of whether a fugitive
defendant who voluntarily turns himself in to the proper authorities
would trigger the fugitive dismissal rule.45
CRIMINAL LAW-DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE
RINGSAKER V. NORTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
North Dakota Highway Patrol Trooper Tanya Sprecher arrested
Jolynn N. Ringsaker for driving under the influence of alcohol.46
Ringsaker was transferred to the Fargo, North Dakota, Police Department
where Trooper Sprecher administered an Intoxilyzer test.47 The test
recorded Ringsaker's blood alcohol level in excess of the statutory maxi-
mum at 0.11.48 Ringsaker requested and received an administrative
hearing to contest the score.49
At the hearing, Trooper Sprecher testified that she followed the
State Toxicologist's approved method for conducting a breath test.50
However, the Intoxilyzer used incorrectly printed the date of the test as
"22/*0/17."51 Because of the error, Ringsaker's attorney objected to
the admission of the test results into evidence.5 2 The hearing officer
admitted the test results into evidence, issued findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law, and suspended Ringsaker's driving privileges.5 3
Ringsaker appealed the suspension of her driving privileges to the
district court.54 The district court reversed the license suspension:
[Tihe State's failure to establish an accurate date on the results
of the alcohol concentration tests creates a doubt. However
43. Id. 21.
44. See id. 123.
45. See id. 122.
46. See Ringsaker v. North Dakota Dep't of Transp., 1999 ND 127, 2, 596 N.W.2d 328, 329.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id. '3.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id. The hearing officer made the following findings:
The Intoxilyzer incorrectly printed the date of the test. The approved method requires
that if the test information is not legible the test information should be reprinted. The test
information on Exhibit 1I is legible. There is no difficulty in reading the information
printed by the Intoxilyzer. For some reason the date is not accurate. However Exhibit II
is the test information from the test conducted on Ms. Ringsaker by Trooper Sprecher on
June 24, 1998.
54. See id. 4.
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small that doubt may be as to the correctness of the entire test,
this [c]ourt cannot conclude that the test was fairly
administered. 55
The North Dakota Department of Transportation (Department) then
appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court.56
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated that its review
was limited to the record before the agency and that it would not review
the decision of the district court. 57 Additionally, the court stated that it
would not make independent findings of fact or substitute its judgment
for that of the agency, but would only determine whether the factual
conclusions were reasonably proven by the weight of the evidence. 58
The Department contended that Ringsaker failed to establish that the test
results were compromised because of the incorrect date.59
The court then proceeded to discuss the foundational requirements
necessary to establish that a chemical analysis test was administered
fairly. 60 The court stated that the foundational requirement could be
met in one of two ways. 61 First, the foundation could be established
through the testimony of the State Toxicologist. 62 Second, the founda-
tion could be established through the introduction of certified copies of
the approved methods and techniques filed by the State Toxicologist
with the clerk of the district court. 63 The court then went on to state that
the testimony of the State Toxicologist at trial takes precedent over the
introduction of other approved methods.64 The court further stated that
these requirements functioned to ease the requirements for admissibility
and to guarantee that such tests were administered accurately and
fairly.65
Next, the court stated that when the State sought to rely on the
introduction of the approved methods to establish a foundation, strict
compliance was required. 66 The court then continued by quoting a
relevant portion of the "Approved Method to Conduct Breath Test with
Intoxilyzer" document. 67 In this quotation, the court stated that the
55. Id.
56. See id.
57. See id. 5.
58. See id., 596 N.W.2d at 330.
59. See id. 1 6.
60. See id. 1 7-8.
61. See id. J[ 8.
62. See id.
63. See id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-07 (1997)).
64. See id.
65. See id. (citing Moser v. North Dakota State Highway Comm'r, 354 N.W.2d 165, 170 (N.D.
1984)).
66. See id.
67. See id. 9, 596 N.W.2d at 330-3 1.
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approved method required that if the Test Record was illegible, the Test
Record must be reprinted. 68 Finally, the court found that the approved
method did not state that the operator should ensure the date on the test
result was legible and admitted that the date was not an essential result of
the test.69 However, the printing of an inaccurate date raises questions
regarding the accuracy of the test results.70
The court then stated that it was the State's burden to establish that
Intoxilyzer tests are administered fairly. 71 Additionally, the court stated
that where a question is raised as to whether the approved method was
followed, the State Toxicologist or a deputy should testify as to the
validity of the test.72 The court held that Ringsaker's Intoxilyzer test
results should not have been admitted into evidence because no one
from the State Toxicologist's office testified as to the validity of the test
and the State failed to make a prima facie showing that the approved
method had been followed. 73 Therefore, the court upheld the district
court's reversal of the administrative suspension of Ringsaker's driver's
license.74
CRIMINAL LAW-EVIDENCE
STATE V. BURKE
In State v. Burke,75 the court upheld the defendant's murder and
arson convictions concluding that there was sufficient evidence to
support the convictions and that the admission of DNA evidence was not
obvious error.76
On April 29, 1997, Burke was charged with murdering two Fargo
men and setting their house on fire. 77 Following his initial appearance
before the district court, Burke was granted public funds to hire an
investigator and ordered to undergo a psychological evaluation at the
state hospital.78
68. See id.
69. See id. 1 10, 596 N.W.2d at 331.
70. See id.
71. See id.1 11.
72. See id.
73. See id. 13.
74. See id. 115, 596 N.W.2d at 332.
75. 2000 ND 25, 606 N.W.2d 108.
76. See State v. Burke. 2000 ND 25, 1 1, 606 N.W.2d 108, 110.
77. See id. 3, 606 N.W.2d at 11. Fargo police believed that Burke killed the two men and set
their home on fire to conceal evidence of the crime. See id. An examiner concluded that the cause of
death was the result of repeated blows to the head with a blunt object. See id. '12.
78. See id. 14.
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At trial, the State introduced into evidence a pair of bloodstained
jeans worn by Burke. 79 It then called an expert witness who testified that
DNA obtained from the bloody jeans matched the DNA of one of the
murder victims. 80 This was followed by witness testimony that placed
Burke at the victims' home shortly before the fire.8 1
The jury found Burke guilty and judgment was entered on Sept-
ember 17, 1998.82 Burke appealed on several grounds including: (1)
insufficient evidence to support his convictions;8 3 (2) unreliability and
inadmissability of the DNA evidence;84 (3) prosecutorial misconduct
deprived him of a fair trial;8 5 and (4) denial of effective assistance of
counsel. 86 However, a unanimous court disagreed with Burke and
affirmed the jury's decision.8 7
In regard to Burke's first contention that there was insufficient
evidence, the court reasoned that it would "reverse a conviction only if,
after viewing the evidence and all reasonable evidentiary inferences in
the light most favorable to the verdict, no rational factfinder could have
found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."88 After
examining the evidence, it concluded that a rationale jury could have
inferred that Burke had purposely killed the two Fargo men and set their
house on fire to conceal evidence.8 9
As for Burke's second contention that the DNA evidence was not
reliable and should not be admitted, the court ruled that the admission of
the DNA evidence was not in error. 90 Since Burke had not objected to
the admission of the DNA evidence at trial, the court limited its inquiry
to whether the admission of this evidence constituted an obvious error
affecting substantial rights. 91 It noted that DNA testing was generally
accepted in the relevant scientific community and that other jurisdictions
had upheld the admission of DNA evidence. 92 It then stressed that
79. See id. T1 3, 6. Burke's girlfriend had given the police these jeans following Burke's arrest
in Nebraska. See id. 1 3.
80. See id. '16.
81. See id. M 7-9. Additionally, one witness testified that Burke had stated he intended to kill Nel-
son and Huotari while another testified that she had seen Burke purchase gasoline the night of the fire.
See id. Tf 7-8.
82. See. id. I 11, 606 N.W.2d at 112.
83. See id. 12.
84. See id. 16.
85. See id. 1 22, 606 N.W.2d at 114.
86. See id. e 34,606 N.W.2d at 116.
87. See id. TI 40-41, 606 N.W.2d at 117.
88. Id. e 12, 606 N.W.2d at 112.
89. See id. T 13-15.
90. See id. 121,606 N.W.2d at 114.
91. See id. 1 16,606 N.W.2d at 112.
92. See id. 17, 606 N.W.2d at 112-13. The court noted that, under section 31-13-02 of the
North Dakota Century Code, DNA evidence is generally considered admissible to establish identity.
458 [VOL. 76:451
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Burke had not offered any evidence suggesting that DNA testing was
unreliable. 93 Finally, it pointed out that Burke had admitted that the
blood on his jeans did belong to one of the victims. 94 Thus, the court
concluded that Burke had failed to demonstrate that the lower court
erred in admitting the DNA evidence.95
The court next rejected Burke's contention that he was denied a fair
trial due to pros,:cutorial misconduct.96 Burke had asserted that: (1) he
was improperly questioned about his drug use; (2) witnesses were
improperly questioned about his drug use; (3) he was improperly ques-
tioned about his failure to offer exculpatory evidence following his
arrest; and (4) prosecutors advanced a timeline theory that was not sup-
ported by the evidence. 97 The court concluded that questions in regard
to Burke's drug use and post-arrest silence were utilized to impeach
Burke and did not affect his substantial rights. 98 As for the timeline
theory, the court concluded that the prosecution's remarks were fair and
reasonable based on the evidence.99
Finally, the court rejected Burke's allegation that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel.100 It found nothing in the record to
substantiate this assertion.101 It added that such claims should not be
brought on direct appeal, but rather through a petition for post-
conviction relief.102
Accordingly, because Burke failed to establish his assertions regard-
ing insufficient evidence, improper admission of evidence, prosecutorial
misconduct, and ineffective assistance of counsel, his convictions were
affirmed. 103
See id. at n.l, 606 N.W.2d at 113.
93. See id. 118.
94. See id. 20, 606 N.W.2d at 114. Burke had testified on his own behalf at trial. See id I 10,
606 N.W.2d at 111-12. He asserted that one of the victims had cut himself while installing carpet and
had gotten blood on Burke's jeans. See id., 606 N.W.2d at 112.
95. See id. 121, 606 N.W.2d at 114.
96. See id. 133,606 N.W.2d at 116.
97. See id. 11 23-31, 606 N.W.2d at 114-16.
98. See id. I 24-30, 606 N.W.2d at 114-15.
99. See id. j 31-32, 606 N.W.2d at 115-16. The court explained that the scope of closing and
opening arguments is largely left to the trial court. See id. 31,606 N.W.2d at 115. A verdict will not
be reversed on such grounds unless the defendant demonstrates that the prosecution's comments were
improper and prejudicial. See id., 606 N.W.2d at 115-116.
100. See id. I 35-39, 606 N.W.2d at 116-17.
101. See id. 1i 37-39.
102. See id. '135, 606 N.W.2d at 116.
103. See id. 140, 606 N.W.2d at 117.
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CRIMINAL LAW-PROBABLE CAUSE FOR A TRAFFIc STOP
KAPPEL V. NORTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
In Kappel v. North Dakota Department of Transportation,104
(Department) the court reviewed the defendant's suspension of driving
privileges.105 Concluding that the actions of the Department were
supported by the underlying facts, the court affirmed the decision.106
On July 25, 1998, at 12:57 a.m., a Grand Forks police officer, while
traveling eastbound, observed a motorcycle stopped at an intersection.10 7
The motorcycle remained stopped at the intersection for an extended
period of time. 108 After the motorcycle executed a right turn, the officer
followed it and observed the motorcycle weave within its own lane
several times. 109 The officer then stopped the vehicle and observed the
driver, Kappel, dismount the motorcycle and stagger.110 Kappel admit-.
ted to consuming nine beers; the officer then administered several
sobriety tests, all of which Kappel failed.Ill Kappel was immediately
arrested for driving under the influence.112
Kappel requested and received an administrative hearing. 1' 3 The
hearing officer found that the police officer had observed Kappel stop
for an inordinately long time at the intersection and also observed Kap-
pel swerving within his lane of traffic. 114 The hearing officer concluded
that the police officer had "reasonable and articulable suspicion" that
Kappel was driving under the influence. 1' 5 Kappel then appealed the
decision to the district court but the decision of the hearing officer was
affirmed. 116
104. 1999 ND 213, 602 N.W.2d 718.
105. See Kappel v. North Dakota Dep't of Transp., 1999 ND 213, 1, 602 N.W.2d 718, 719.
106. See id. 19, 602 N.W.2d at 722,
107. See id. 1 2, 602 N.W.2d at 719. There was no traffic observed in either direction. Id.
108. See id. The motorcycle remained at the intersection for the time it took the officer to travel
two to three blocks towards the intersection until he was approximately 20 feet behind it. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id. If 2-3. The officer also detected the odor of alcohol on Kappel's breath and noticed
slurred speech. See id. 3.
111. See id
112. See id.
113. See id.14.
114. See id., 602 N.W.2d at 719-20.
115. See id, 602 N.W.2d at 720.
116. See id. 5. The district court found that Kappel had stopped at the intersection for a longer
than usual time. See id. This constituted a reasonable and articulable suspicion, and it justified
Kappel's stop. See id.
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On review, the court first noted that a license suspension is governed
by the Administrative Agencies Practice Act. 117 The court reviews the
agency record, not the district court decision.118
Kappel contended that the police officer did not have reasonable
and articulable suspicion to stop him; thus, all evidence discovered after
the stop was improperly admitted at the hearing.119 The court stated that
the reasonable suspicion standard must be objective and based upon the
totality of the circumstances. 120 "Reasonable suspicion to justify a stop
exists when 'a reasonable person in the officer's position would be
justified by some objective manifestation to suspect potential criminal
activity."' 121 Since reasonable suspicion is not as exact as probable
cause, a mere hunch of criminal activity is not enough to detain a
motorist. 122 However, the court noted that officers should consider
"inferences and deductions that an investigating officer would make
which may elude a layperson."1 23 Presumably, officers are to assess an
unfolding situation and utilize their experience and training to determine
whether the totality of the circumstances will create a reasonable
suspicion.124
Kappel contended that the officer did not see him commit a traffic
offense, thus the stop was not justified.125 Next, Kappel contended that
there might be innocent reasons for a longer than typical stop at a traffic
sign or weaving within one's own traffic lane, thus, this stop was
unreasonable.126 The court then quoted an excerpt from the United
States Supreme Court decision in Illinois v. Gates,127 which stated that
probable cause only requires a probability or substantial chance of
criminal activity, thus, innocent behavior will frequently provide
117. See id. 6 (citing N.D. CENT CODE. ch. 28-32 (1991 & Supp. 1999)).
118. See id. (citing Dworshak v. Moore, 1998 N.D. 172, 6, 583 N.W.2d 799). The decision of
the agency must be affirmed unless:
1. a preponderance of the evidence does not support the agency's findings;
2. the agency's findings of fact do not support its conclusions of law and its decision;
3. the agency's decision violates the constitutional rights of the appellant;
4. the agency did not comply with the Administrative Agencies Practice Act in its
proceedings;
5. the agency's rules or procedures have not afforded the appellant a fair hearing; or
6. the agency's decision is not in accordance with the law.
Id. (quoting Greenwood v. Moore, 545 N.W.2d 790, 793 (N.D. 1996)).
119. See id. 7.
120. See id. (citing City of Fargo v. Ovind, 1998 ND 69, 8, 575 N.W.2d 901).
121. Id (quoting Ovind, 1998 ND 60, 8, 575 N.W.2d 901 (quoting State v. Ova, 539 N.W.2d
857, 859 (N.D. 1995))).
122. See id. (citing Salter v. North Dakota Dep't of Transp., 505 N.W.2d 111, 114 (N.D. 1993)).
123. Id. 8 (quoting Ovind, 1998 ND 69, 9, 575 N.W.2d 901).
124. See id.
125. See id. 19.
126. See id.
127. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
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probable cause. 128 The court focused on the officer's testimony, which
revealed two articulable reasons for the stop: (1) the length of time
Kappel was stopped and (2) Kappel's weaving within his own lane. 129
Additionally, the officer's experience with DUI arrests brought Kappel's
behavior under suspicion.130
Kappel contended that the court's decision in Salter v. North
Dakota Department of Transportation131 shows that weaving within a
traffic lane is insufficient to justify a reasonable suspicion stop.' 32
However, in Salter, the court found that driver weaving was characterized
as "slight" or "minimum" and was not included within the arresting
officer's report. 133 Here, the officer found Kappel's weaving consistent
with the behavior of other DUI arrests and included "weaving" in the
arrest report. 134
The court stated that Kappel's prolonged stop further distinguished
Kappel's case from Salter.135 In Salter, the defendant was travelling at a
low rate of speed in a no-passing zone, thus, Salter did not impede traffic
flow and the record did not support the charges.136 Here, the officer's
unrefuted testimony about the prolonged intersection pause rose to the
level of reasonable suspicion, and thus, is distinguishable from Salter.137
On this basis, the court found that a reasonable person in the officer's
position would suspect Kappel was intoxicated or impaired. 138 The court
concluded that the investigative stop of Kappel was justified and
affirmed the district court's suspension of Kappel's driving privileges.139
128. See Kappel v. North Dakota Dep't of Transp., 1999 ND 213, 1 9, 602 N.W.2d 718, 720
(citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244 n.13 (1983)).
129. Id 11,602 N.W.2d at 721.
130. See id.
131. 505 N.W.2d 111 (N.D. 1993).
132. See Kappel, 17, 602 N.W.2d at 722 (citing Salter v. North Dakota Dep't of Transp., 505
N.W.2d 111, 114 (N.D. 1993)).
133. See id. (quoting Salter, 505 N.W.2d at 113).
134. See id. 13, 602 N.W.2d at 721-22; see also State v. Guthmiller, 499 N.W.2d 590, 593 (N.D.
1993) (Levine, J., concurring in result) (stating that a prolonged stop by a driver sufficient to show
reasonable suspicion of DUI); State v. Goeman, 431 N.W.2d 290, 291-92 (N.D. 1988) (holding that a
stop is justified when a vehicle weaved within its own lane after an abrupt stop); Neset v. North
Dakota Highway Comm'r, 388 N.W.2d 860, 862-63 (N.D. 1986) (concluding a stop is justified when a
driver weaves within their own lane); State v. Dorendorf, 359 N.W.2d 115, 117 (N.D. 1984) (stating
that intra-lane weaving justifying a stop of a vehicle).
135. See id. 18, 602 N.W.2d at 722.
136. See id. (citing Salter, 505 N.W.2d at 113-114).
137. See id.
138. See id 19.
139. See id.
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CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE
STATE V. WANZEK
On April 20, 1998, Officer Thomas Nagle of the Jamestown Police
Department issued a parking ticket to a vehicle owned by Kimberly K.
Wanzek.140 Officer Nagle performed a license check on the owner of
the vehicle and discovered that Wanzek did not have a valid driver's
license. 141 Furthermore, while Officer Nagle was writing out the ticket,
Wanzek approached him and he noted that she appeared to have been
drinking. 142
Approximately one hour later, Officer Nagle observed Wanzek's
vehicle traveling in front of his squad car. 143 Officer Nagle recognized
Wanzek as the driver of her vehicle as it pulled up to an apartment
building.144 As Officer Nagle's squad car approached Wanzek's vehicle,
Wanzek exited her vehicle and looked directly at Officer Nagle. 145
Officer Nagle made contact with Wanzek outside of her vehicle, beside
the rear driver's side door.146 Wanzek was arrested for driving with a
suspended license and for driving under the influence of alcohol. 147
Officer Nagle then proceeded to search the passenger compartment of
Wanzek's car. 148 This search yielded a bag of marijuana, found in the
glove box. 149 Wanzek was charged with possession of a controlled
substance in addition to her driving violations. 150
Before trial, Wanzek brought a motion to suppress the marijuana
discovered in the glove box, alleging that Officer Nagle's search violated
her Fourth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and
similar provisions of the North Dakota State Constitution. 151 Wanzek's
motion was denied, and a jury found her guilty of possessing a con-
trolled substance. 152 Wanzek then appealed to the North Dakota
Supreme Court.15 3
140. See State v. Wanzek, 1999 ND 163, 1 2, 598 N.W.2d 811, 812.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id. 3, 598 N.W.2d at 812-13.
144. See id., 598 N.W.2d at 813.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id. 14.
151. See id. (citing N.D. CoNsT. art I, § 8).
152. See id.
153. See id. 1 1, 598 N.W.2d at 812.
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On appeal, the court noted that the only issue before it was the
"validity of a warrantless search of the passenger compartment of a
vehicle driven by an arrestee who has voluntarily exited the vehicle prior
to her arrest." 154 The court noted that this precise issue was one of first
impression in the State of North Dakota. 155 In Chimel v. California,156
the United States Supreme Court held that a police officer could search
the arrestee and the area within the arrestee's immediate control. 157 In
New York v. Belton,158 the Supreme Court further defined Chimel's
"area of immediate control" to apply to the passenger compartments. of
vehicles occupied by arrestees. 159
Wanzek argued that because she had exited her vehicle before she
was arrested, she was no longer an "occupant," and therefore the Chimel
rule that officers may not search beyond the area in the arrestee's
immediate control applied to her, and not the Belton rule that officers
can search the passenger compartments of automobiles occupied by
arrestees. 160 The court recognized that different jurisdictions have
reached different results when confronted with similar situations.161 The
North Dakota Supreme Court followed the line of cases holding that
vehicles recently occupied by arrestees are subject to search incident to
arrest. 162 The holding will avoid the risk of encouraging officers to race
to vehicles before potential arrestees can exit and avoid allowing
potential arrestees to prevent searches of their vehicles by simply exiting
their vehicles before the police can reach them. 163
The court also rejected Wanzek's argument that the search violated
the North Dakota Constitution. 164 On the facts of this case, the court
held that Wanzek's rights under the North Dakota Constitution were
identical to her rights under the federal constitution; thus, the North
Dakota Constitution afforded her no additional protection165
154. Id 16, 598 N.W.2d at 813.
155. See id.
156. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
157. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
158. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
159. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
160. See State v. Wanzek, 1999 ND 163, 10, 598 N.W.2d 811, 814.
161. See id. 12-14, 598 N.W.2d at 814-15.
162. See id. 15-18, 598 N.W.2d at 815-16.
163. See id.
164. See id. n 19-21, 598 N.W.2d at 816.
165. See id. 121.
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
CITY OF BISMARCK V. FETTIG
Kimberly Ann Fettig appealed from a district court judgment find-
ing her guilty of driving under the influence. 166 Fettig was charged by
the City of Bismarck with driving under the influence and pled not
guilty in Bismarck Municipal Court.167 As the charge was made in a
municipal court, Fettig was required under North Dakota Century Code
section 40-18-15.1 to request a jury trial within twenty-eight days if she
desired to have a jury trial. 168 Fettig failed to request a jury trial within
twenty-eight days from the date of her appearance, and waited more than
two weeks after the twenty-eight-day period had expired to file a motion
to request a jury trial.169 Although Fettig expressed difficulty in obtain-
ing an opinion from her court-appointed attorney as to whether to elect
a jury trial, no ineffective assistance of counsel issue was raised on
appeal.170
Fettig's motion was denied and she was found guilty in a bench trial
in municipal court. 171 Fettig appealed her case to the district court. 172
She moved for a jury trial and requested the court find North Dakota
Century Code section 40-18-15.1 unconstitutional, claiming it denied
her the right to a jury trial. 173 The district court denied the motion and
Fettig was found guilty.174 Fettig then appealed to the North Dakota
Supreme Court.17 5
In considering Fettig's argument that North Dakota Century Code
section 40-18-15.1 is unconstitutional, the court found it necessary to
briefly look at the background of the legislation.176 Under section
40-18-15.1 of the North Dakota Century Code, "[a] case in municipal
court must be transferred to district court to obtain a jury trial."177 In
North Dakota, the court has held that "[c]ities are creatures of statute
and possess only those powers and authorities granted by statute or
166. See City of Bismarck v. Fettig, 1999 ND 193, 11, 601 N.W.2d 247, 248.
167. See id. 12.
168. See id., 601 N.W.2d at 248-49.
169. See id. 1 3, 601 N.W.2d at 249.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id. 1 2, 601 N.W.2d at 248.
176. See id. 4, 601 N.W.2d at 249.
177. li 5 (citing N.D. CEN. CODE § 40-18-15.1 (Supp. 1999)).
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necessarily implied from an express statutory grant."' 78 Thus, cities
"without home rule charters are not authorized to provide for jury trials
in municipal court." 179  The court then observed that in 1973 the
legislature repealed the statute granting cities the power to hold jury
trials in municipal court, so there "is no existing authority granting such
power."180
Fettig specifically argued that North Dakota Century Code section
40-18-15.1 violated both the United States Constitution and the North
Dakota Constitution because she was deprived of a jury trial by her
non-action.181 The court first noted that the United States Constitution
was inapplicable because it did not apply to "petty" offenses and next
examined the right of trial by jury in municipal court at the time the
North Dakota Constitution was adopted.182
The basis for demanding a jury trial in municipal court was found
in the 1877 Revised Codes of the Territory of Dakota.183 The 1877
Code provided for a justice of the peace to decide cases arising under
town ordinances "without the intervention of a jury, unless the defen-
dant demand a trial by jury." 184 Particularly, the court noted that this
demand requirement was not altered after the adoption of the state consti-
tution and that action, or lack thereof, strongly evinced legislative intent
to not change the demand requirement.185 Thus, requiring a defendant
to request a jury trial under North Dakota Century Code section
40-18-15.1 does not "stray the boundaries of our constitution." 186
Finally, Fettig asserts that she was denied her right to a jury trial
guaranteed by the North Dakota Century Code section 40-18-15, which
allows for a jury trial in absence of an express waiver of it.187 This
appears to be in direct conflict with section 40-18-15.1 wherein a defen-
dant may lose the right to a jury trial without affirmatively waiving the
right.188 As the court noted, section 40-18-15.1 is more specific than sec-
tion 40-18-15 because section 40-18-15 broadly provides for retrial but
does not specifically reference jury trials in district court. 189 Section 40-
18-15.1 was also more recently enacted.190 The court also referenced a
178. Id L4.
179. Id (citing City of Riverside v. Smuda, 339 N.W.2d 768, 770 (1983)).
180. Id.
181. See id. 6, 601 N.W.2d at 249-50.
182. See id. 6-7.
183. See id. 9. 601 N.W.2d at 250-51.
184. See id., 601 N.W.2d at 250.
185. See id. 11,601 N.W.2d at 251.
186. See id. 12, 601 N.W.2d at 252.
187. See id. 13.
188. See id.
189. See id. I 13-16, 601 N.W.2d at 252-53.
190. See id. 1 17, 601 N.W.2d at 253.
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North Dakota Attorney General's opinion stating section 40-18-15.1
should prevail.191
Thus, the Supreme Court of North Dakota concluded that section
40-18-15.1 "implicitly supersedes" section 40-18-15 and that cities
with home rule ordinances may provide for a jury trial in municipal
court.192 "Otherwise, a municipal court defendant must request transfer
to district court within twenty-eight days of arraignment to get a jury
trial." 193 The conviction of Fettig was affirmed. 194
FAMILY LAW-CHILD CUSTODY
Aus v. CARTER
In Aus v. Carter,195 the court analyzed whether a new trial should be
granted to reexamine a custodial parent's move when purportedly false
information is submitted to the court during the initial custody deter-
mination. 196 Concluding that the trial court erred in failing to treat the
motion for a new trial as a motion for a change in custody, the court
found that the trial court abused its discretion and remanded the case for
further proceedings. 197
Kelvin Aus and Tommie "Jane" Carter lived together from Decem-
ber 1993 until November 1995 and have one daughter together.198 The
child lived with the mother, after the relationship ended in 1995.199 In
March 1996, Aus sued for custody of the child and for child support
and Carter counter-sued for custody and child-support.200 In June 1998,
the trial court found Aus had no contact with his children and was in
arrears for child support for his children from a prior marriage. 201 Aus
was also in arrears for child support due under an interim support agree-
ment with Carter. 202 The court also found that Carter had extended
family in Missouri and had secured a job there. 203 Finally, the court
191. See id. at (citing 1996 N.D. Op. Att'y Gen. 37).
192. See id. 19.
193. Id (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-18-15.1 (Supp. 1999)).
194. See id. 120.
195. 1999 ND 246, 603 N.W.2d 885.
196. See Aus v. Carter, 1999 ND 246, 1 1, 603 N.W.2d 885, 887. Justice Sandstrom concurred in
the result. See id. 24, 603 N.W.2d at 891 (Sandstrom, J., concurring in result).
197. See id
198. See id. 1 2. The child was born in July 1994. See id.
199. See id.
200. See id. 3. Both parties agreed that Carter was to have primary physical custody and
receive $100 per month from Aus until trial. See id. An interim order to this fact was entered in
January 1997. See id.
201. See id. 4.
202. See id.
203. See id.
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found Carter to be the primary caregiver during the child's lifetime and
that the child had lived with Carter after the relationship with Aus
ended.204
Using the factors set forth in North Dakota Century Code section
14-09-06.2, the trial court found the capacity for love, affection, guid-
ance and continuation of the child's education favored Carter.205 Carter
was the favored parent for the provision of food, clothing, medical care,
and other care due primarily to the arrearages created by Aus.206 Final-
ly, the court found Carter provided the most stable environment and was
favored to provide the permanence of the existing home.207 Thus, the
trial court awarded custody of the child to Carter, permitted Carter to
move to Missouri and granted Aus visitation. 208
Aus filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to North Dakota Rules
of Civil Procedure, rule 59(b)(3)-(6) in September 1998.209 The trial
court denied the motion for a lack of evidentiary support. 210 Aus moved
for a new trial again in November 1998.211 Aus supported this motion
by asserting that Carter presented a forged document to the court during
the initial custody proceeding. 212 Aus claimed the forged letter is newly
discovered evidence material to the initial decision. 213 The trial court
acknowledged that "[t]he letter was false and misleading" and that
"[Carter] may have known it was false." 2 14 However, the trial court
reasoned that the false letter did not affect the best interest of the child
analysis and it "would have allowed the move without the letter." 2 15
The trial court determined the letter was not newly discovered evidence
that was material and refused Aus' motion.216 Aus appealed by contend-
ing the false letter illustrates Carter's deceitful nature and lack of paren-
tal fitness, both relevant factors for the best interest analysis of North
Dakota Century Code section 14-09-06.2(1)(f).2 17
204. See id.
205. See id
206. See id. Aus had not provided for the children from his former marriage nor the child from
his relationship with Carter. See id
207. See id The child has lived with Carter all of her life. See id.
208. See id.
209. See id. 5.
210. See id.
211. See id. 6.
212. See id.
213. See id. The letter indicated that Carter had secured an employment opportunity with a
business in Missouri. See id.
214. Id. 17.
215. Id., 603 N.W.2d at 887-88.
216. See id., 603 N.W.2d at 888.
217. See id.I 7.9.
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The North Dakota Supreme Court treated Aus' motion as two
distinct motions, one examining the award of custody to Carter and the
other re-examining the permission to move. 218 Citing their decision in
Lovin v. Lovin,219 the court noted that a party's motion for a new trial
based on newly discovered evidence in a custody .case must be treated as
a motion for a change of custody.220 In Lovin, the court explained that a
motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence in a
custody proceeding is improper since the trial court maintains juris-
diction to modify custody. 221
A motion to modify a custody order may not be made earlier than
two years after entry of the custody order, unless agreed to by the parties
in writing. 222 Even after the two years, the power of the trial court to
modify custody is limited. 223 The trial court may modify an order
before the two-year period expires if any of three exceptions exist. 224
Here, the court found the trial court failed to treat the motion for a
new trial as a motion for a change of custody and did not indicate
whether any of the three statutory exceptions applied. 225 The court
concluded that failure of the trial court to treat Aus' motion as one for a
change of custody may have prejudiced Aus. 226 Deceiving a court by
presenting false evidence requires analysis of the party's motives, and
may allow for application of one or all of the statutory exceptions under
North Dakota Century Code section 14-09-06.6(5).227
The court did not attempt to assume which exception applied as it
was clear the district court used the wrong legal standard.228 The court
remanded the case to the district court to make the findings necessary to
218. See id. 1 8. The trial court's judgement both awarded custody of the child to Carter and
permitted Carter to move to Missouri. See id. Thus, the trial court's denial of Aus' motion for a new
trial gave rise to two distinct issues. See id.
219. 1997 ND 55, 561 N.W.2d 612.
220. See Aus, 1 10, 603 N.W.2d at 888 (citing Lovin v. Lovin, 1997 ND 55, In 12-13, 561
N.W.2d 612, 617). Neither party cited Lovin in their appellate briefs or at oral argument. See id. at
n.2. None of the documents submitted at trial made reference to Lovin. See id.
221. See id. 1 10 (citing Lovin, 1997 ND 55, 1 13, 561, N.W.2d at 617).
222. See id. I 11 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.6 (1997)).
223. See id. The two-year limitation does not apply if there is a "persistent and willful denial or
interference with visitation[,]" the "child's present environment may endanger the child's physical or
emotional health," or the "primary physical care of the child has changed to the other parent for
longer than six months." Id.
224. See id. 12 (citing limitations of the court's power to modify a prior custody order under
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.6(5)).
225. See id. 1 13.
226. See id. 14, 603 N.W.2d at 889.
227. See id.
228. See id. The trial court applied a standard applicable to procedural rules rather than the
applicable statutory rules. See id.
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determine whether the existing record is sufficient or if additional
testimony is needed to apply the correct legal standard. 229
The court also addressed whether granting a new trial was supported
by North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 59(b)(4).230 Granting a
new trial requires the trial court to have abused its discretion by not
granting the motion. 231 The trial court indicated the false letter did not
affect its decision to allow the move; however, it failed to use the proper
test to determine whether the move was in the best interests of the
child.232 Aus raised the Stout factors and started to argue their applica-
bility, but the trial court "cut him off" and stated that the mother can
leave unless she is doing so to purely "foil" visitation by Aus.233 The
court stated that the trial court's failure to use the Stout factors pre-
judiced Aus, and held this was an abuse of discretion.234 Thus, the court
reversed and remanded the review of the motion for a new trial to
determine if the new evidence requires a different result when the Stout
factors are applied. 235
229. See id.
230. See id 115. According to Rule 59(b)(4) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, a
new trial can be granted when new evidence, material to the applicant, is discovered and could not,
with reasonable diligence, have been discovered and produced at trial. The requirements for
granting a new trial are:
(1) the evidence must have been discovered following trial;
(2) the movant must have exercised due diligence in discovering the evidence;
(3) the evidence must not be merely cumulative or impeaching;
(4) the evidence must be material and admissible; and
(5) the evidence must be such that a new trial would probably produce a different
result.
See Aus, 1999 ND 246, 1 17, 603 N.W.2d at 889 (quoting McAdoo v. McAdoo, 492 N.W.2d 66, 68
(N.D. 1992)).
231. See id. 1 18, 603 N.W.2d at 889-90. A court has "abuse[d] its discretion if it acts in an
arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner, or if it misinterprets or misapplies the law." Id.
(citing Security Nat'l Bank v. Wald, 536 N.W.2d 924, 928 (N.D. 1995)).
232. See id 20, 603 N.W.2d at 890. The "proper" test is a consideration of four factor known
as the Stout factors:
(1) the prospective advantages of the move in improving the custodial parent's and
child's quality of life;
(2) the integrity of the custodial parent's motives for relocation;
(3) the integrity of the noncustodial parent's motives for opposing the move, particularly the
extent such opposition is intended to secure a financial advantage with respect to continuing
child support; and
(4) the potential negative impact on the relationship between he noncustodial parent and the
child, including whether there is a realistic opportunity for visitation which can provide an
adequate basis for preserving and fostering the noncustodial parent's relationship with the
child if relocation is allowed, and the likelihood that each parent will comply with such
alternate visitation.
Id. 1 19 (citing Stout v. Stout, 1997 ND 61, 19, 560 N.W.2d 903, 911).
233. See id. 20 (citing Stout, 19, 560 N.W.2d at 911).
234. See id. in 21-22 (citing Stout, '119, 560 N.W.2d at 911).
235. See id. 23, 560 N.W.2d at 891 (citing Stout, 1997 ND 61, 19, 560 N.W.2d at 911).
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FAMILY LAW-DIVORCE-PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION
MELLUM V. MELLUM
In Mellum v. Mellum, 2 36 the court upheld an unequal distribution of
property following a couple's divorce.237 It also upheld an order of
contempt issued against the husband by the trial court.238
Following their marriage in 1972, John Mellum opened a construc-
tion business and built several rental properties while his wife Debra
obtained a degree in education. 239 Debra also assisted with the business
and raised the couple's four children. 240 The couple's relationship was
marred by incidents of abuse and infidelity. 241 Although they did attend
marriage counseling, Debra sought a divorce in 1997 after John moved
out of the couple's home and in with a female coworker.242
An interim order was entered in September 1998, providing that
Debra would use income generated by the couple's rental properties to
pay bills relating to those properties. 243 However, in early 1999, John
intercepted approximately $8,700 from the couple's tenants and used
$4,500 to pay expenses unrelated to the rental properties. 244 Debra
learned of her husband's actions and moved for an order of con-
tempt. 245 The trial court subsequently concluded that John had dis-
obeyed the interim order and commanded him to pay Debra $4,500.246
John appealed. 247 This appeal was later joined with John's appeal of the
trial court's divorce judgment. 248 In the divorce judgment, the trial
court awarded Debra $742,000 in property while John received property
valued at $407,000.249
On appeal, John asserted that the court had: (1) falsely suggested
the existence of a sexual relationship between John and his coworker
prior to the couple's separation; (2) failed to note his contributions to
236. 2000 ND 47, 607 N.W.2d 580.
237. See Mellum v. Mellum, 2000 ND 47, 1, 607 N.W.2d 580, 582.
238. See id.
239. See id. 2.
240. See id.
241. See id. 3. John had two extramarital affairs. See id. Both parties committed some
physical and emotional abuse. See id.
242. See id. 1 4. John began working with Jennifer Owens in 1997. See id. Debra thought that
the two were having an affair and asked John to stop working with Jennifer. See id. When he
refused, Debra asked him to move out and John then moved in with Jennifer. See id
243. See id. 5, 607 N.W.2d at 582-83.
244. See id. 6, 607 N.W.2d at 583.
245. See id.
246. See id.
247. See id.
248. See id. 8.
249. See id.
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the couple's construction business; (3) falsely suggested that he did not
want to save his marriage; and (4) erred in determining Debra's income
because it did not impute income to Debra based on a teacher's
salary. 250 The North Dakota Supreme Court rejected all of his
arguments. 251 It concluded that the trial court's findings were consistent
with the evidence and were not clearly erroneous. 252
Next, John contested the court's distribution of the marital property,
pointing out that had Debra received approximately sixty-five percent of
the property to his thirty-five percent. 253 However, as the court ex-
plained, property distributions must be equitable, but not necessarily
equal. 254 It explained that "the trial court's determinations regarding
division of property are treated as findings of fact and will not be
reversed unless they are clearly erroneous." 255
The court listed three factors indicating that the trial court had
adequately explained its distribution in accordance with the Ruff-Fischer
guidelines. 256 First, it highlighted John's bad conduct during the mar-
riage. 257 Second, it emphasized findings that indicated John possessed a
greater earning ability than Debra.258 Finally, it pointed out that Debra
was given more property in lieu of spousal support. 259 Thus, it con-
cluded that the trial court's distribution was not erroneous. 260 As for the
order of contempt, there was sufficient evidence to support the finding
that John had willfully and inexcusably intended to violate the order.261
250. See id. 1 10-13, 607 N.W.2d at 583-85.
251. See id.
252. See id. First, the court determined there was a relationship between there John and Owens.
See id. 1 10, 607 N.W.2d at 583-84. Second, the trial court had recognized John's contributions to the
business. See id. 1 11, 607 N.W.2d at 584. Third, John admitted that he had two affairs during his
marriage to Debra and had been the one to terminate the couple's marriage counseling. See id. 12.
Finally, the trial court's use of paraprofessional wages to calculate Debra's income was appropriate
since Debra did not possess a teaching license and had never pursued a full-time teaching career. See
id 1 13, 607 N.W.2d at 584-85.
253. See id. 14, 607 N.W.2d at 585.
254. See id. (citing Fox v. Fox, 1999 ND 68, 1 7, 592 N.W.2d 541, 544).
255. See id. (citing Kautzman v. Kautzman, 1998 ND 192, 1 8, 585 N.W.2d 561, 564).
256. See id. TI 15-18, 607 N.W.2d at 858-86. The Ruff-Fisher guidelines are guidelines adopted
from two cases: Ruff v. Ruff, 52 N.W.2d 107 (N.D. 1952) and Fisher v. Fisher, 39 N.W.2d 845 (N.D.
1966). See Mellum v. Mellum, 2000 ND 47,1 15 n.5, 607 N.W.2d 580, 585.
257. See id. 17 (explaining that conduct during marriage is a consideration under the Ruff-
Fischer guidelines).
258. See id. 1 18, 607 N.W.2d at 586 (noting that John and Debra had agreed that Debra would
stay home and raise the couple's children).
259. See id. 1 19 (explaining that such a distribution could help "disentangle the parties' financial
affairs").
260. See id. 20.
261. See id. 22-23, 607 N.W.2d at 586-87. John conceded that he failed to comply with the
interim order by intercepting rent checks. See id. 22. The court noted that John could have sought
judicial relief instead of taking matters into his own hands. See id.
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Justice Sandstrom dissented from the majority's opinion. 262 He
stated the majority never offered an explanation of the disparate sixty-
five percent to thirty-five percent division of the couple's property. 263
Justice Sandstrom further stated since the district court did not fully
explain it's reasons for dividing the couple's property as it did, the court
should reverse and remand to the district court.264
FAMiLY LAw-DIVORCE-SPOUSAL SUPPORT
PEARSON V. PEARSON
In a post-divorce action seeking a reduction or termination in
spousal support and payment of attorney fees, Elof Pearson asked the
court to reconsider an order denying him a reduction in spousal
support.265 Pearson grounded his action on the alleged material changes
in circumstances of his ex-wife's needs and abuse of discretion by the
trial court in awarding attorney fees. 266 The North Dakota Supreme
Court affirmed the lower court's decision, finding no material change
and no abuse of discretion. 267
After thirty-three years of marriage, Myrtle Pearson sued Elof
Pearson for divorce and the two came to a voluntary agreement regard-
ing spousal support and a fair and equitable division of the parties'
property. 268 Myrtle's attorney prepared the judgment, which did not
include remarriage as a condition to terminate the monthly payments,
although there was some discussion of it during the divorce proceeding,
by the two attorneys, regarding tax issues. 269 The divorce was final in
1993 and after the divorce, in late 1994 or early 1995, Myrtle began
cohabitating with Dewaine McLeod in Canada.270 After a few years, they
moved to Alberta, Canada where they purchased a home, had a joint
bank account, and shared common household expenses. 271 Myrtle was
designated as McLeod's common law spouse for purposes of Canadian
tax and health insurance but both maintained they were able to "just
walk away" with "no ties attached." 272
262. See id. 26, 607 N.W.2d at 587 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting).
263. See id.
264. See id. I 27, 30, 607 N.W.2d at 587-88.
265. See Pearson v. Pearson, 2000 ND 20, 1, 606 N.W.2d 128, 129.
266. See id.
267. See id. Justice Sandstrom concurred in the result. See id. 1 31, 606 N.W.2d at 136 (Sand-
strom. J., concurring in result).
268. See id. 2, 606 N.W.2d at 129-30.
269. See id., 606 N.W.2d at 130.
270. See id. 13.
271. See id.
272. See id.
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As a result of Myrtle's new status, Elof asked the trial court to
reduce or eliminate his spousal support obligation due to Myrtle's
significant change in circumstances. 273 Elof alleged that Myrtle and
McLeod had a common law marriage, thus they were "remarried" and
spousal support should be terminated. 274
The term "remarriage" was not listed in the divorce judgment as a
condition for terminating support and the court declined to "import a
term not provided in the judgment." 275 Further, the trial court found
that Myrtle was not being supported by McLeod, nor was she married to
him, and thus there was no change in circumstances justifying a change
in spousal support. 276 Therefore, Elof had presented no evidence
showing that Myrtle's cohabitation decreased her financial needs. 277
Following its own precedent, the court pointed out that under North
Dakota law, mere cohabitation is not a material change in circumstances
justifying a change in spousal support.278
The court further stated that even if Elof had established that a
marriage existed between Myrtle and McLeod, "extraordinary circum-
stances" existed requiring the continuance of spousal support.279 These
"extraordinary circumstances" were found in the parties' agreement
that created a situation "analogous to a rental agreement." 280 Elof had
the right to use Myrtle's share of their joint life estate in real property in
exchange for a monthly payment. 281 Hence, any new relationship of
Myrtle's would not justify reduction of payments where Elof' s use of
the land remained unchanged. 282
The court also rejected Elof's argument that "public policy favors
eliminating support when the recipient cohabits." 283 Cohabitation is
illegal in North Dakota, however Myrtle and McLeod cohabitated in
Alberta where it was completely lawful. 284 Hence, the court found that
"[p]unishing Myrtle by terminating her monthly payments because of
her actions in Alberta that are lawful and accepted there would be
inequitable ."285
273. See id. 4.
274. See id. 16.
275. Id.
276. See id. 13, 606 N.W.2d at 132.
277. See id. 17, 606 N.W.2d at 133.
278. See id. 14, 606 N.W.2d at 132 (citing Cermak v. Cermak, 1997 ND 187, 569 N.W.2d 280).
279. See id. 110, 606 N.W.2d at 131.
280. See id. 21, 606 N.W.2d at 134.
281. See id.
282. See id.
283. See id. 1 22-23.
284. See id. 123.
285. Id.
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The trial court also awarded $4,000 in attorney's fees to Myrtle.286
Elof protested this award on the basis that the trial court did not have
authority to award fees and alternatively, abused its discretion in doing
80.287
The trial court rejected Elof's motion to reverse an award of
attorney fees because it found Elof's motion to terminate or reduce
spousal support was without merit. 288 The North Dakota Supreme Court,
though, concluded it did have merit based on the complexity of the
issues involved in the case.289 However, the court upheld the trial court's
award of attorney's fees. 290 The court found that Myrtle had a mone-
tary need for payment of attorney fees and there was no evidence
presented to suggest Elof lacked the financial resources to pay them.291
In conclusion, the court held that the trial court did not err in
denying termination of Elof' s spousal support obligation because there
was no material change in circumstances that would justify a change in
spousal support. 292 Further, there was no abuse of discretion in the
award of attorney fees. 293
FAMILY LAW-GRANDPARENT VISITATION
HOFF V. BERG
In Hoff v. Berg,294 Jerome and Nicolette Hoff appealed a district
court decision dismissing their complaint seeking visitation with their
grandchild. 295 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district
court's determination that a 1993 amendment to the grandparent
visitation statute 296 was unconstitutional. The court then reversed the
order dismissing the Hoffs' complaint, and remanded the matter for
consideration under the provisions of the statute prior to the 1993
amendment. 297
286. See id. 1 1,606 N.W.2d at 129.
287. See id. n 24, 25, 606 N.W.2d at 134-35.
288. See id. 25, 606 N.W.2d at 135.
289. See id. 127.
290. See id. 1 30, 606 N.W.2d at 136.
291. See id. 129, 606 N.W.2d at 135.
292. See id. 1 30, 606 N.W.2d at 135-36.
293. See id., 606 N.W.2d at 136.
294. 1999 ND 115, 595 N.W.2d 285. For an in-depth analysis of this case please refer to: David
T. Whitehouse, Comment, Constitutional Law-Grandparent Visitation Rights: North Dakota Declares
the Grandparent Visitation Statute Unconstitutional, 76 N.D. L. REV. 161 (2000).
295. See Hoff v. Berg, 1999 ND 115, I 1,595 N.W.2d 285, 286.
296. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (1997).
297. See Hoff, 1 20, 595 N.W.2d at 292.
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In 1992, a child was born to Holly Berg and Nathan Hoff, who were
not married. 298 Holly Berg married Dan Berg in 1995.299 The parents
of Nathan Hoff, Jerome and Nicolette Hoff, were dissatisfied with the
visitation Holly Berg had allowed them with their grandchild, and they
sued Holly Berg under North Dakota Century Code section 14-09-05.1
for "implementation of a visitation schedule allowing the enforcement
of their visitation rights." 300 The district court ruled that section 14-09-
05.1 is unconstitutional, and dismissed Hoffs' complaint for grand-
parental visitation. 301 The Hoffs appealed. 302
In considering the judgment of the district court, the North Dakota
Supreme Court acknowledged that although a child's parents have the
right to determine if a relationship with the grandparents, or any other
person, is contrary to the child's best interests, all fifty states have
enacted grandparent visitation legislation. 303 In 1983, the North Dakota
Legislature enacted a statute providing that grandparents and great-
grandparents may be awarded visitation rights to an unmarried minor.304
The statute was amended in 1993 to provide that grandparents and
great-grandparents must be awarded visitation rights absent a finding
that visitation is not in the best interests of the child.305 As amended, the
statute included a presumption that visitation rights of grandparents were
in the best interests of the child.306
In assessing the constitutionality of the amended statute, the court
began by recognizing that natural parents have a fundamental liberty
interest in the care, custody, and management of their children under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 307 The court
continued by looking to the North Dakota Constitution and stated:
[t]he pursuit of happiness guaranteed by [the North Dakota
Constitution, article I section 1] includes "the right to enjoy
the domestic relations and the privileges of the family and the
home ... without restriction or obstruction ... except in so far
as may be necessary to secure the equal rights of others,"
298. See id. 2, 595 N.W.2d at 286-87. Nathan Hoff was adjudicated the father of the child,
although he was never formally granted visitation rights. See id.
299. See id.
300. Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1).
301. See id.
302. See id.
303. See id. 4, 595 N.W.2d at 287 (citations omitted).
304. See id. 5.
305. See id.
306. See id.
307. See id. 8, 595 N.W.2d at 288 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)).
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which is protected and insured by the due process clause of
[North Dakota Constitution, Article I, section 12].308
The court addressed the appropriate level of scrutiny to be used when
deciding the constitutionality of the grandparent visitation statute, 309 and
ultimately concluded that strict scrutiny review is to be used when
analyzing statutory intrusions on parents' fundamental rights to control
their children's associations. 310
The court first concluded that the State did not have a compelling
interest in presuming grandparent visitation is in the best interests of the
child.311 Second, the court found that forcing parents to abide by
court-ordered grandparental visitation unless the parents can prove such
visitation would not be in the best interests of the child, would not itself
be in the best interest of the child.312 The court also opined that
methods of promoting grandparent visitation could be more narrowly
tailored. 313 The court concluded that the statute as amended in 1993 was
unconstitutional to the extent that it required courts to grant grand-
parents visitation rights and presumed visitation rights of grandparents
are in the child's best interest. 314 The court determined those provisions
violated parents' fundamental liberty interest in controlling the persons
with whom their children associate, a right protected by the Due Process
clauses of the state and federal constitutions. 3 15 Thus, the part of the
statute declared unconstitutional was nullified, leaving the statute prior to
the 1993 amendment intact.316
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed to the
extent that it ruled unconstitutional the 1993 amendment creating the
presumption and requiring grandparental visitation unless such visitation
is not in the best interests of the child.317 The order dismissing the
Hoffs' complaint was reversed, and the matter was remanded for consid-
308. Id. 1 10, 595 N.W.2d at 289 (quoting State v. Cromwell, 9 N.W.2d 914, 919 (N.D. 1943)).
309. See id. 12. The Hoffs argued that the statute does not infringe, deprive, or substantially in-
terfere with a fundamental right, and a rational relationship standard should apply. See id. The Hoffs
argued in the alternative that if the statute does substantially interfere with a fundamental right, that the
statute satisfies strict scrutiny. See id. The Attorney General agreed that the rational relationship
standard applies because of the minimal intrusion resulting from grandparent visitation. See id. Berg,
on the other hand, argued that a strict scrutiny standard applies because court-imposed grandparental
visitation substantially affects a parent's fundamental rights. See id.
310. See id. 16, 595 N.W.2d at 291.
311. See id. 118.
312. See id.
313. See id.
314. See id.
315. See id.
316. See id. 19, 595 N.W.2d at 292.
317. See id. 20.
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eration in accordance with the statute as it existed prior to the 1993
amendment. 318
PROPERTY-PARTITION OF REAL PROPERTY
TREIBER V. ELMER
In Treiber v. Elmer,319 Anne Treiber and Citizens State Bank ap-
pealed an award of summary judgment dismissing Treiber's action for
the partition of real property. 320 The North Dakota Supreme Court
affirmed the district court's summary judgment order, holding that
partition of property under North Dakota Century Code section 32-
16-01 is available only when there are cotenants with current possessory
interests. 321
In 1975, Fred Treiber deeded a tract of land to his three children
reserving a life estate to his wife, Anne Treiber. 322 In 1994 two of the
children deeded their remainder interests to Anne, and the third deeded
her interest to Jack and Lori Elmer. 323 This gave Anne Treiber, through
the doctrine of merger, a fee simple interest in an undivided two-thirds
of the property. 324 The Elmer's held an undivided one-third remainder
interest, subject to Anne Treiber's life estate.325 Anne Treiber brought a
partition action against the Elmers and various mortgage and lien
holders.326
The first issue the court briefly addressed was Citizens State Bank's
attempted appeal. 327 The court found a potential jurisdictional problem,
in that the bank was not an aggrieved party by a judgment of the district
court, which would prevent an appeal to the Supreme Court.328 To be an
aggrieved party, the bank's interest had to be "immediately, directly,
and adversely affected." 329 The court found it unnecessary to deter-
mine the bank's interest because of Treiber's timely filed appeal which
gave the court jurisdiction over the appeals in this case. 330
318. See id.
319. 1999 ND 130, 598 N.W.2d 96.
320. See Treiber v. Elmer, 1999 ND 130, 1 1, 598 N.W.2d 96, 97.
321. See id. 1.
322. See id. 2.
323. See id.
324. See id.
325. See id.
326. See id. 3.
327. See id. 14.
328. See id. 5, 598 N.W.2d at 98 (citing Jensen v. Zuem, 523 N.W.2d 388, 388-89 (N.D. 1994)
for the proposition that only an aggrieved party by judgment is allowed to appeal).
329. Id. (citing King v. Stark County, 10 N.W.2d 877, 878 (N.D. 1943)).
330. See id. 7. The court determined that because they had jurisdiction over Treiber's claim
they could resolve all the issues raised by the parties on the merits. See id.
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In this appeal Anne Treiber and Citizens State Bank assert that the
district court erred in determining that two or more cotenants with
current possessory interests are required in order to partition property
under North Dakota Century Code section 32-16-01.331 The language
of section 32-16-01 states that partition may be brought when the
cotenants "hold and are in possession of real or personal property." 332
The court noted at the outset that prior to this case it had never addressed
directly whether current possessory interests are required under this
statute.333
Because the issue of current possessory interests was one of first
impression, and, because the North Dakota legislature adopted section
32-16-01 from both New York and California without change, the court
determined that it would presume the legislature intended the same
construction as those states. 334 Both the New York and California
statutes have been interpreted to require current possessory interests. 335
Therefore the court determined that the express terminology of section
32-16-01 requires two or more cotenants with current possessory inter-
ests, 336 rejecting the argument that the language "in possession" can be
interpreted to mean in possession of an interest in the land.337
Treiber and the bank made several other arguments in favor of
partition, which the court ultimately rejected as well. 338 The summary
judgment ruling, dismissing Treiber's partition action was therefore
affirmed.339
331. See id.19.
332. See id. The court looked to the history of North Dakota Century Code section 32-16-01,
from its adoption of New York and California partition statutes, which were adopted themselves from
traditional common law partition law. See id. 10-11, 598 N.W.2d at 98-99. The court noted that a
distinctive feature of cotenancy has been the unity of possession. See id. 1 10.
333. See id. 11,598 N.W.2d at 99.
334. See id. 14, 598 N.W.2d at 99-100 (citing State v. Dilger, 322 N.W.2d 461, 464 (N.D.
1982) for the proposition that the legislature intends the same construction when statutory language
remains the same as the model state statute).
335. See id. 14, 598 N.W.2d at 100.
336. See id. 15.
337. See id. 23, 598 N.W.2d at 101.
338. See id. 16-22, 24-28, 598 N.W.2d at 100-02. Treiber and the bank argued both public
policy and statute ambiguity as reasons for allowing the partition of the property. See id. 16-22, 598
N.W.2d at 100-01 (finding that the public policy argument should be addressed by the legislature, and
noting that the statute ambiguity can be cleared up by fixing a typo which the legislature never meant
as a change to the statute). Finally the court refused to follow Treiber's suggestion that the court
follow Montana's move in which the Montana court ignored the language of the partition statute and
focused entirely on equity. See id. 24-28, 598 N.W.2d at 101-02 (declining to follow Lawrence v.
Donovan, 619 P.2d 1183 (Mont. 1980)).
339. See id. 1 29, 598 N.W.2d at 102.
2000] 479
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
TORTS--CONTRACrS-GOOD FAITH
BARNES V. ST. JOSEPH'S HOSPITAL
In Barnes v. St. Joseph's Hospital,340 Dr. William Barnes appealed
from a summary judgment dismissing his action against St. Joseph's and
awarding damages to the Hospital on its counterclaim. 341 The North
Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court judgment, concluding
that Barnes failed to raise an issue of material fact as to whether the
Hospital acted in bad faith.342 The court also affirmed the counterclaim
judgment because Barnes failed to raise an issue of material fact as to
whether the Hospital's conduct rendered performance by Barnes
impossible. 343
Barnes was practicing as an otolaryngologist in California when the
Hospital recruited him to move his practice to North Dakota. 344 On
March 1, 1992, the parties entered into an agreement whereby the
Hospital paid Barnes to relocate his independent practice to Minot. 345
Among other terms of the agreement, 346 the parties agreed the Hospital
would provide office space for Barnes at no cost until August 1, 1995.347
In 1993, the Hospital and a Minot clinic entered into a ten-year
agreement whereby the Hospital would provide financial assistance to the
clinic to recruit physicians to Minot.348 In 1994, the clinic decided to
hire an otolaryngologist. 349 Although Barnes applied for the position,
the clinic hired someone else, who began practicing with the clinic in
1995.350 Barnes asserted that once this doctor began practicing at the
clinic, other physicians at the clinic stopped referring patients to him and
his practice was significantly affected. 351 On August 1, 1995, the agree-
ment for rent-free office space ended and the Hospital began billing
Barnes for rent. 352 Barnes failed to pay any rent, and on March 6, 1996,
340. 1999 ND 204, 601 N.W.2d 587.
341. See Barnes v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 1999 ND 204, 1,601 N.W.2d 587, 588.
342. See id. 15, 601 N.W.2d at 591.
343. See id. 20, 601 N.W.2d at 592.
344. See id. 2, 601 N.W.2d at 588.
345. See id.
346. See id. 3, 601 N.W.2d at 588-89. The parties also agreed the Hospital would pay the costs
of establishing Barnes' practice an all operational expenses of his office, would provide a substantial
income guarantee for Barnes, and would provide a "signing bonus." See id.
347. See id. 4, 601 N.W.2d at 589.
348. See id. 5.
349. See id. 6.
350. See id.
351. See id.
352. See id. 7.
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the Hospital asked Barnes to move his office out of the Hospital. 353
Barnes ultimately closed his practice on May 23, 1996.354
Barnes brought suit asserting a tort claim for breach of an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.355 The Hospital filed a counter-
claim for the amounts due under the agreement. 356 The district court
granted summary judgment dismissing Barnes' claim and awarded the
Hospital $299,859,53 on its counterclaim. 357 Barnes appealed to the
North Dakota Supreme Court. 358
The court concluded that the Hospital did not act in bad faith in
paying the clinic to recruit other physicians. 359 The court noted that
Barnes provided no evidence that the Hospital actively participated in the
recruitment process beyond its general agreement with the clinic,360 and
that no evidence was provided suggesting that the parties had agreed that
Barnes would have a monopoly on otolaryngology practice. 36 1 The
court also concluded that the Hospital did not act in bad faith in asking
Barnes to move his office out of the Hospital, because "[t]he duty to act
in good faith 'does not obligate a party to accept a material change in
the terms of the contract or to assume obligations that vary or contradict
the contract's express provisions,' nor does the duty of good faith
'inject substantive terms into the parties' contract." 362 Although the ex-
press agreement between the parties provided that Barnes could occupy
the office rent-free until August 1, 1995, Barnes argued that the Hos-
pital's duty of good faith required it to continue to provide the office
rent-free after that date. 363 The court characterized Barnes' argument as
"ludicrous," 364 and concluded that Barnes failed to raise an issue of
material fact as to bad faith and affirmed the district court's dismissal of
his claim.365
353. See id. The Hospital also offered to help Barnes find other suitable office space. See id.
354. See id.
355. See id. 8.
356. See id.
357. See id.
358. See id.
359. See id. 1 1, 601 N.W.2d at 590. North Dakota has not recognized a tort action for breach
of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in cases involving commercial contracts. See id.
110. However, the court stated that deciding whether such an action exists was unnecessary, because
even assuming such an action exists, Barnes failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on bad
faith. See id.
360. See id. 11.
361. See id. 12.
362. Id. E 13-14, 601 N.W.2d at 590-91 (quoting Wells Fargo Realty Advisors Funding, Inc. v.
Uioli, 872 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994)).
363. See id. 14, 601 N.W.2d at 591.
364. Id.
365. See id. 15.
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As to the counterclaim award, Barnes appealed claiming the Hospi-
tal's actions made it impossible for him to perform the contract. 366 The
court, however, concluded that there was no evidence in the record to
support Barnes' assertion that the Hospital in any way prevented him
from practicing, nor that it played an active role in eliminating his
referral base or bringing another otolaryngologist to Minot.367 Finally,
the court opined that Barnes' assertion that the Hospital had a duty to
continue to provide him rent-free office space beyond the agreed date
and that its failure to do so wrongfully prevented him from performing
the contract was "frivolous." 368 Accordingly, the court concluded that
the Hospital's conduct did not render performance by Barnes impossible
and that Barnes failed to raise an issue of material fact sufficient to
preclude summary judgment on the Hospital's counterclaim. 369
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-DAMAGES
LEMER v. CAMPBELL
In Lemer v. Campbell,370 Loren Campbell appealed a judgment
against him in the amount of $12,269.88 for costs and disbursements in
Marla Lemer's negligence action against him. 371 Marla Lemer cross-
appealed from the jury verdict and judgment.372 The North Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court holding that the court did not
abuse its discretion in awarding costs and disbursements against
Campbell, and that Lemer failed to establish a basis for reversing the
judgment. 373
Marla Lemer's negligence action arose on February 28, 1992, when
her vehicle was struck from behind, by a vehicle driven by Campbell,
while she was attempting to turn left into a restaurant parking lot from
Main Avenue in Bismarck. 374 Lemer alleged that she suffered disabling
injuries, medical and rehabilitative expenses, pain and suffering, and loss
of productive time and avocation. 375
The jury found Campbell negligent and that his negligence was the
proximate cause of Lemer's injuries, awarding Lemer $3,000 for past
366. See id. 16.
367. See id. 18, 601 N.W.2d at 592.
368. See id.
369. See id. 19.
370. 1999 ND 223, 602 N.W.2d 686.
371. See Lemer v. Campbell, 1999 ND 223, 1 , 602 N.W.2d 686.
372. See id.
373. See id.
374. See id. 12.
375. See id.
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medical expenses, and no other damages. 376 The trial court, upon
Campbell's motion, off-set any jury amount up to $25,000 which had
already been paid by Lemer's no-fault insurer.377 Therefore, a judg-
ment in favor of Lemer was entered, giving no damages and awarding
her costs and disbursements according to North Dakota Century Code
sections 28-26-01 and 28-26-06.378
Campbell contends that the trial court erred in determining that
Lemer was the prevailing party, and that neither party should be con-
sidered prevailing for the purpose of recovering costs and disburse-
ments. 379 The court determined that to be a prevailing party in a tort
action a party must prevail on the issues of negligence and proximate
cause, which Lemer did in this case.380 The only reason Lemer was not
allowed to recover damages was due to the setoff, not the merits of the
case. 381 Therefore, the court found that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by awarding Lemer costs and disbursements in this case. 382
In Lemer's cross appeal she contends the trial court made numer-
ous errors, primarily relating to Campbell's attorney's opening state-
ment and references to her driving under the influence of alcohol. 383
The court noted that Lemer objected only once to comments she
thought to be inappropriate, and this failure to continue objecting waived
any improper argument made by Campbell. 384 The court determined
that Lemer's failure to move for a new trial had failed to preserve a
separate ground for reversal. 385
The court also rejected Lemer's argument that evidence of her
license suspension was not relevant and prejudicial to her case, as well as
the argument that Campbell's references to her drinking and marijuana
use prejudiced the jury. 3 86 Lemer based the argument on the incon-
sistent nature of the jury award and her actual expenses. 387 However,
after reviewing the expert testimony, the court concluded that there was
376. See id.
377. See id. 3.
378. See id.
379. See id. 4. Under section 28-26-09 of the North Dakota Century Code, the costs and dis-
bursements are allowed for the prevailing party. See id.
380. See id. 1 7, 602 N.W.2d at 689 (citing Andrews v. O'Hearn, 387 N.W.2d 716, 732 (N.D.
1986)). The court noted that a party can be prevailing without having actually recovered damagesthe
determinate factor is whether the verdict was rendered and judgment entered for that party. See id.
19.
381. See id. 11,602 N.W.2d at 690.
382. See id.1 11.
383. See id. U 12-15, 602 N.W.2d at 690-91.
384. See id. I 14, 16.
385. See id. 16, 602 N.W.2d at 691.
386. See id. 1 17-21.
387. See id. 22, 602 N.W.2d at 691-92.
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sufficient evidence to support the damage award given. 388 The judgment
of the lower court was therefore affirmed on all grounds. 389
Justice Maring concurred in part and dissented in part in relation to
Lemer's cross-appeal. 390 Maring concurred in the majority opinion in
relation to Lemer's waiver of her claim of error by failing to object to
improper comments.39 1 Justice Maring dissented from the portion of the
opinion upholding the jury verdict. 392 Justice Maring stated that the
failure of the jury to award any amount for pain and suffering indicated
a verdict based on passion and prejudice and she would reverse and
remand on the issue of damages. 393
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-JURY INSTRUCTIONS
HARFIELD V. TATE
In Harfield v. Tate,394 the court recognized that distracting circum-
stances, when deemed "sudden and critical," may excuse otherwise
negligent conduct. 395 However, it concluded that the distraction at issue
in this case was of the defendant's own making and did not excuse his
carelessness. 396
Todd and Ginger Harfield filed suit against Jeremy Tate after they
were rear-ended by him while exiting Interstate 29, in Fargo. 39 7
Apparently, Tate heard a noise coming from the back of his truck,
turned to investigate, and was unable to avoid colliding with the Har-
fields' car once returning his eyes to the road. 398 The Harfields alleged
that, due to Tate's negligence, Ginger had suffered a soft tissue injury
and incurred nearly $13,000 in medical expenses. 399 As for their car,
estimates indicated that there was approximately $2,000 in damage.400
At trial, the Harfields called an expert who testified that Tate's truck
was traveling in excess of seven and one-half miles per hour when it
388. See id. IN 23-25, 602 N.W.2d at 692.
389. See id. 26.
390. See id. 28, 602 N.W.2d at 692-93 (Maring, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
391. See id. However, Justice Maring cautions that she does not want to see the court condone
the conduct of Campbell's attorney in making improper comments throughout this case. See id.
392. See id. 129.
393. See id. 9H 30-32, 602 N.W.2d at 693.
394. 1999 ND 166, 598 N.W.2d 840.
395. See Harfield v. Tate, 1999 ND 166, 19, 598 N.W.2d 840, 845 (citing Souden v. Johnson,
125 N.W.2d 742, 743 (Minn. 1963)).
396. See id. 1 20.
397. See id. 2, 598 N.W.2d at 841-42.
398. See id.
399. See id. 3, 598 N.W.2d at 842.
400. See id. 2.
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struck the Harfield car.401 This was later challenged by a defense expert
who testified that Tate's truck was travelling too slowly to cause the
damage alleged by the Harfields. 402
As the trial concluded, the Harfields moved for judgment as a mat-
ter of law that Tate was negligent and that his negligence was the proxi-
mate cause of Ginger's injuries.4 03 However, the motion was denied. 404
The court, over the Harfields' objection, submitted instructions to the
jury regarding distracting circumstances. 405 The jury ruled in Tate's
favor and the Harfields complaint was dismissed with prejudice.4 06
On appeal, the court focused primarily on the issue of the jury
instruction. 407 First, it explained that instructions may "constitute revers-
ible error only when calculated to mislead the jury or, in other words,
when they are prejudicial." 408 It added that the trial court's choice of
instructions are usually afforded great deference. 409 It also pointed out
that while the theory of "distracting circumstances" is commonly
associated with premise liability, it has been utilized in automobile negli-
gence cases to abate the severe consequences of contributory negligence
on plaintiff victims.4 10
Next, the court stated that the "distracting circumstances" doctrine
remained viable in comparative liability jurisdictions even though it is a
contributory negligence concept. 411 While it recognized that its "adop-
tion of comparative negligence has shifted the focus from traditional,
doctrinal labels to the singular, inclusive concept of fault, [the court]
nevertheless conclude[d] the adoption of comparative fault ha[d] not
rendered a distracting circumstances instruction necessarily error." 412
Such an instruction is predicated on the idea that circumstances,
when supported with sufficient evidence, may excuse or mitigate an
401. See id. 14.
402. See id. The defense expert testified that the Tate vehicle was traveling approximately five
miles per hour at impact. See id.
403. See id. 5.
404. See id.
405. See id. The instructions stated that "[iln determining whether the Defendant exercised due
care in the operation of the Chevy truck, you may consider whether distracting circumstances existed
and whether, under the circumstances, the distracting circumstances excuse the Defendant's failure to
see what is in plain sight." Id.
406. See id.
407. See id. 16.
408. Id. (quoting Dale v. Cronquist, 493 N.W.2d 667, 670 (N.D. 1992)).
409. See id. (citing Dale, 493 N.W.2d at 670).
410. See id. 8, 598 N.W.2d at 843.
411. See id. 9.
412. Id. 12, 598 N.W.2d at 844 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The court drew
analogies between the "distracting circumstances," the "momentary forgetfulness," and the "sudden
emergency" doctrines. See id. 10-11, 598 N.W.2d at 843-44. However, it stressed that instructions
that unduly emphasize distracting circumstances are unacceptable. See id. 12, 598 N.W.2d at 844.
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individual's negligence.4 13 However, the existence of distracting circum-
stances does not affect the standard of care required nor does it absolve
an individual from liability.414 The person invoking this doctrine must
still exercise the degree of care that an ordinary prudent person would
exercise under similar circumstances. 415
After reflecting upon the facts in this case, the court concluded that
the trial court erred when instructing the jury on the doctrine of "dis-
tracting circumstances." 4 16 It explained that Tate had not been dis-
tracted by the plaintiff or a third party and thus the instruction was
improper.4 17 In the court's opinion a reasonable person would find that
Tate should have seen the Harfield's car and avoid the collision. 418
Thus, it concluded that the trial court abused its discretion when denying
the plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law.419 It reversed the
trial court's judgment and remanded the matter back for a new trial on
the issue of damages.4 20
413. See id. 14.
414. See id. 15-16, 598 N.W.2d at 844-45. "[A] tortfeasor's negligence cannot be excused or
mitigated by distracting circumstances or sudden dangers of his own making." Id. '115, 598 N.W.2d at
884.
415. See id. 16, 598 N.W.2d at 845.
416. See id. 20, 598 N.W.2d at 845.
417. See id. 1 20, 598 N.W.2d at 845.
418. See id. 21, 598 N.W.2d at 845-46.
419. See id. V 22-23, 598 N.W.2d at 846.
420. Id. 123.
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